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Between development and social policies: the impact of 
European Structural Funds in Objective 1 regions
* 
 
Abstract: European regional support has grown in parallel with European integration. 
The funds targeted at achieving greater economic and social cohesion and reducing 
disparities within the European Union (EU) have more than doubled in relative terms 
since the end of the 1980s, making development policies the second most important 
policy area in the EU. The majority of the development funds have been earmarked 
for Objective 1 regions, i.e. regions whose GDP per capita is below the 75% threshold 
of the EU average. However, the European development policies have come under 
increasing criticism based on two facts: the lack of upward mobility of assisted 
regions and the absence of regional convergence. This paper assesses, using cross-
sectional and panel data analyses, the failure so far of European development policies 
to fulfil their objective of delivering greater economic and social cohesion by 
examining how European Structural Fund support is allocated among different 
development axes in Objective 1 regions. We find that, despite the concentration of 
development funds on infrastructure and, to a lesser extent, on business support, the 
returns to commitments on these axes are not significant. Support to agriculture has 
short-term positive effects on growth, but these wane quickly, and only investment in 
education and human capital – which only represents about one eight of the total 
commitments – has medium-term positive and significant returns.  
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Introduction  
 
Since the mid-1980s the importance of EU development policies has not ceased to 
increase, both in legal and budgetary terms. In legal terms, the question of achieving 
‘Economic and Social Cohesion’ in Europe was upgraded from being just a mention 
in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome to becoming Title XIV (currently Title XVII) 
after the passing of the Single European Act. In budgetary terms, development 
policies have grown from representing a mere 10% of the European Communities 
budget and 0.09% of the EU-15 GDP in 1980 to more than one third of the budget and 
around 0.37% of the EU GDP, as an average of the period 1998-2001. Development 
policies have become, after the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the second 
largest policy area in the EU. 
 
The increasing importance and visibility of EU development policies is related to the 
political view that European integration was and is likely to unleash centripetal 
economic forces and therefore to bring greater benefits to the European core, 
increasing the gap between the core and the periphery to socially and politically 
unacceptable levels. In accordance with this political belief, the EU gave development 
policies the ambitious target of achieving greater economic and social cohesion and of 
“reducing disparities between the level of development of the various regions” (Art. 
158 of the EU Treaty). Such target implies not simply avoiding greater divergence 
among European regions, but effectively counteracting the possible centripetal effects 
of European integration and of all other factors contributing to the concentration of 
economic activity in core areas. Hence every recent step towards greater economic 
integration has been accompanied by measures aimed at preparing the lagging   4
countries and regions of the EU to cope with the challenges ahead. First, the 
establishment of the Single Market was preceded by the 1989 reform of the Structural 
Funds. The reform implied not just the co-ordination of the then three Structural 
Funds and a comprehensive restructuring of the principles that guided their action, but 
also the doubling in relative terms of the monies committed to regional development, 
from 15.1% of the European budget in 1988 to 30.2 in 1992. Second, the decision in 
the Maastricht reform to create the Single European Currency was tied in with the 
establishment of the Cohesion Fund in order to alleviate the burdens that transition to 
EMU would impose on the less developed member states of the EU (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Spain).  
 
After the reform more than two thirds of all Structural Fund expenditure has been 
concentrated in the so-called Objective 1 regions, that is, the regions whose GDP per 
capita measured in purchasing power standards (pps) is less than 75% of the EU 
average. The concentration of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Funds in the less 
privileged areas of the Community has meant that European development support 
throughout the 1990s has hovered between 3 and 3.5% of GDP in Portugal, between 
2.5 and 3.0% in Greece and Ireland, and between 2 and 3% in many Italian and 
Spanish Objective 1 regions (European Commission, 2000: 213; Cuadrado-Roura, 
2001).  
 
Yet, despite their rising macroeconomic importance, questions are being raised about 
the capacity of European development policies, in general, and of policies targeted at 
Objective 1 regions, in particular, to deliver their objective of achieving greater 
economic and social cohesion and of reducing the gap between the centre and the   5
periphery of the EU. These questions are fundamentally based on two facts. First is 
the incapacity of assisted regions to grow beyond the threshold of assistance. Second 
is the increasing evidence that regional convergence – which was the norm in across 
Europe until the late 1970s – has come to a halt (Canova and Marcet, 1995; Cheshire 
and Magrini, 2000). 
 
In this paper we analyse to what extent have the Structural Funds succeeded in their 
objective of “reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various 
regions” (Art. 158), by focusing on the policy axes to which the Structural Funds have 
been allocated. In order to achieve that, the paper is divided into five further sections. 
The first section presents the EU development policies and the evolution of Objective 
1 since the implementation of the reform of the Structural Funds in 1989. Section two 
looks at recent trends in regional disparities across the EU, in general, and Objective 1 
regions, in particular. Section three analyses the overall impact of Structural Fund 
expenditure in Objective 1 regions, while section four highlights the extent to which 
the allocation of funds across four development axes (infrastructure, business support, 
agriculture and rural support, and human capital) may be affecting the capacity of 
Structural policies to reduce the gap between the core and the periphery of the EU. 
Section five concludes. 
 
1. European Development Policies in Objective 1 regions 
 
The decision to implement the Single European Market represented a boost for 
European regional development policies. The political belief that European economic 
integration was likely to foster the development of core regions at the expense of the   6
periphery (Padoa-Schioppa, 1987; Emerson, 1988; European Commission, 1994) led 
to the introduction of the principle of ‘Economic and Social Cohesion’ in the Single 
European Act. In order to achieve this principle, a radical reform of regional 
development policies followed in 1989. The reform implied the coordination of all 
existing Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF, and EAGGF-Guidance Section) under the 
principles of territorial and financial concentration, programming, partnership, and 
additionality
1. The reform was accompanied by a doubling of the regional 
development funds in the space of four years: from 15.1% of the European budget and 
0.16% of the European GDP in 1988 to 30.2 and 0.33% respectively in 1993 (Table 
1.1). Although since 1993 the relative size of the Structural Funds has increased at a 
much slower pace and it is due to decline until 2006 (European Commission, 2001), 
the monies available for development have continued to grow in absolute terms 
(Table 1.1). 
 
Insert Table 1.1 around here 
 
Since the reform, the Structural Funds are allocated through the multi-annual planning 
of assistance. For Objective 1 regions, five to seven year Community Support 
Frameworks (CSFs), which are supplemented by Operations Programmes (Ops), are 
approved by the Commission in consultation with the relevant member state – and, 
whenever relevant, with the involvement of regional tiers of government in the 
process – on the basis of regional development plans previously submitted by the 
nation-states. Two programming periods have been already completed (1989-93 and 
1994-9) and a third one (2000-6) is underway. 
                                                 
1 A fifth principle of efficiency was later introduced.   7
 
The largest percentage of Structural funds is spent, following the principle of 
territorial concentration, in promoting the development and structural adjustment of 
Objective 1 regions. Despite successive restructurings of the Structural Funds since 
1989, the operating criterion to qualify for Objective 1 has remained unchanged: to 
have a GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power parities and calculated on the 
basis of Community figures for the last three years available, of less than 75% of the 
Community average
2 (cfr. Council Regulation 1260/99, art. 3).  
 
The number of Objective 1 regions has grown with every programming period. In 
1989 forty-four regions qualified as Objective 1. This group included the whole of 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, the south of Italy and most regions in southern and 
western Spain, plus Northern Ireland, Corsica and the French overseas Departments 
and Territories. German reunification brought the five Länder of the former GDR and 
East Berlin into the Objective. New regions in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the UK became eligible in 1994 for the second planning period and 
Burgenland after Austrian membership. For the programming period 2000-6 and after 
the inclusion of the former Objective 6 into Objective 1, sixty-seven regions qualify 
as Objective 1, eleven of which will be phased out by the end of the period. 
 
                                                 
2 Although the 1989-93 and 1994-99 regulations allowed for certain Objective 1 
regions whose GDP was around 75% of the EC average, but for which there were 
special reasons to be included in Objective 1. The insertion after 2000 of the former 
Objective 6 regions – for the development and structural adjustment of regions with 
an extremely low population density in Sweden and Finland – in Objective 1 entails a 
further deviation from the main criterion.    8
As a whole, Objective 1 regions receive more than two-thirds of the total Structural 
Fund expenditure. These funds are allocated both to regional specific operation plans 
and to multiregional national plans that cover several regions. EU development 
support represents a considerable percentage of the GDP of Objective 1 regions. 
According to our calculations
 (see Annex 1), between 1989 and 1999 the 
commitments of the Structural Funds amounted on average to 1.74% of the GDP of 
Objective 1 regions. 0.90% was allocated to regional and an average of 0.84% went to 
multiregional commitments
3. There are however considerable geographical and 
chronological variations in the allocation of funds. From a geographical perspective, 
whereas in the better off Objective 1 regions, such as Abruzzo or Apulia in Italy, 
Northern Ireland in the UK, Corsica in France, Hainaut in Belgium, or Flevoland in 
the Netherlands, the Structural Fund support has remained below the 1% of GDP 
threshold, in poorer areas regional support has been much higher. In the 
ultraperipheral Portuguese archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira, Structural Fund 
support has exceeded in certain years 5% of GDP. In Alentejo in Portugal, in 
Extremadura in Spain, and in some Greek regions Structural Fund commitments have 
been at periods in excess of 3% of GDP. From a chronological perspective, the 
variation is also significant.  
 
Successive CSFs and Ops have established the priorities for intervention in Objective 
1 regions. These priorities change across regions and adopt a host of different names 
and labels in different CSFs, with wide variation even across regions in the same 
country. The range of names used varies from the strait forward (transport, tourism, 
                                                 
3 Not all countries – starting by those that have only one Objective 1 region – have 
multiregional commitments.   9
fisheries, or human resource development) to the vague (‘development of regional 
potential’ or ‘local development or potential’) and the mysterious (‘optimisation of 
geographic position’ in the case of Western Greece). However, after analysing in 
detail all the CSFs for the first two programming periods (1989-93 and 1994-9), the 
EU’s development support intervention in Objective 1 regions can be classified 
according to four main axes that closely reflect the priorities described in the First 
Annual Report on the implementation of the Reform of the Structural Funds (1991). 
These four priority axes are: 
a)  support to agriculture and rural promotion (A); 
b)  business and tourism support (B); 
c)  investment in education, re-qualification and all measures targeting the 
human capital of the region (H); 
d)   investment in infrastructure, transport, and environment (I). 
  
The volume of expenditure on each of the axes is very uneven. According to our 
calculations, for the period 1989-99, about half (49.6%) of the Objective 1 Structural 
Funds were committed to investment in infrastructure, transport, and the environment. 
Business and tourism support came a distant second with 23.2%, followed by 
investment in education and human capital related issues with 13.3% and support to 
agriculture and rural promotion with 8%. The remaining 5.9% was committed to areas 
that are difficult to classify under any of the above categories (see Annex 1 for an 
explanation on the origin and calculation of data).  
 
Once again there are huge geographical and chronological differences in the 
importance of each of the axes. From a geographical perspective, different countries   10 
have tended to privilege different axes. Table 1.2 reports the national allocation of 
Objective 1 commitments in the two programming periods, omitting the small 
percentage of funds difficult to classify under any of the four defined categories. 
Infrastructure and the protection of the environment has been the preferred axis in 
Spanish, Portuguese, Greek, Italian, French, and Dutch regions during both 
programming periods. The focus on infrastructure has been particularly evident in 
Spain and Portugal, where about half of the total available funding was committed to 
that axis during the first period, rising to more than three fourths for the second (Table 
1.2). Business and tourism support has been the main axis in Ireland, accounting for 
over half of the total commitments during the second period, and in the Austrian and 
Belgian regions that joined Objective 1 in 1994, where it represented two thirds of the 
total. It also was the most important development axis in Northern Ireland during the 
first programming period. Support to human capital development only outstripped 
other areas of involvement in British Objective 1 regions during the second period, 
and represented more than a quarter of commitments in Portugal and Ireland in the 
first period, and in Italy during the second period. Support to agriculture and rural 
development has been the weakest axis, drawing more than one fifth of commitments 
only in French and Spanish Objective 1 regions during the first period and in Italian 
and Dutch regions during the second (Table 1.2).   
 
Insert Table 1.2 around here 
 
From a chronological perspective, the share of investment in business and tourism 
support and, above all, in infrastructure increased in the second programming period 
at the expense of the share of investment in human capital and rural support (Table 
1.2). Overall, development strategies for Objective 1 regions have been characterised   11 
by a strong imbalance across development axes. With a few exceptions CSFs have 
been heavily biased towards one or two priority areas. The Portuguese regions in the 
Iberian Peninsula or Attica during the second programming periods, with their strong 
focus on infrastructure, embody the extreme cases of an unbalanced development 
strategy. Most other CSFs also suffer, to a greater or lesser extent, from the same 
problem. 
 
2. Structural Funds and the evolution of European regional 
disparities 
 
As we have seen, since the reform of the Structural Funds in 1989, the amount of 
European money aimed at the strengthening of social and economic cohesion and at 
the reduction of regional disparities across the EU has been multiplied. European 
development policies have not only become the second largest policy area in the EU, 
but also represent a significant proportion of public expenditure in Objective 1 
regions. However – and in spite of some overly positive European Commission 
(1999) evaluations of the contribution of the Structural Funds to economic cohesion in 
Europe
4 – questions have been recently raised about the capacity of Structural Funds 
of delivering their objective of reducing regional inequalities across Europe (Martin, 
1999; Hurst, Thisse, and Vanhoudt, 2000; Puga, 2002). It has even been claimed that, 
in its current form, European regional development policies are more of an income 
                                                 
4 In the Executive Summary of the 1999 Sixth Periodic Report, the Commission 
claims that there is ‘unambiguous’ evidence of convergence and that this “unusually 
rapid pace of convergence, both from an historical and international perspective […] 
has been driven largely by closer European economic integration, but the Structural 
Funds have also played an important part” (1999: 7). The tone has been more 
moderate in successive reports (e.g. European Commission 2001).   12 
support or redistribution strategy, than policies capable of setting the bases for long-
term sustainable development (Rodríguez-Pose, 2000: 112; Boldrin and Canova, 
2001: 211). 
 
To what extent are these criticisms accurate or fair? Have European development 
policies more than a decade after the reform of the Structural Funds not succeeded in 
their objective of triggering greater economic and social cohesion and lower 
disparities? Two key factors are behind these doubts. First comes the remarkable 
stability of the regions eligible for Objective 1, as forty-three of the original forty-four 
regions that qualified for the Objective in 1989 remain in it fourteen years after the 
reform. Only Abruzzo in Southern Italy managed to come out at the end of 1997. Four 
other original regions (Corsica, Lisbon and the Tagus Valley, Molise, and Northern 
Ireland), plus parts of the Republic of Ireland, are being phased out of the Objective 
and will lose their support at the end of 2005 or 2006.  
 
The second factor behind the scepticism over the capacity of European regional 
policies to deliver has been the lack of convergence across European regions since the 
implementation of the reform of the Structural Funds. The post-war regional 
convergence detected in numerous studies (Barro and Sala-i-Martín, 1991; 
Armstrong, 1995; Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1995; Molle and Boeckhout, 1995; Tondl, 
2001) gradually gave way to stability or even divergence in the last two decades of 
the 20
th century (Magrini, 1999; Rodríguez-Pose, 1999; Cuadrado-Roura, 2001; Puga, 
2002). In addition, there is growing evidence of the emergence of convergence clubs 
(Neven and Gouyette, 1995; Quah, 1996) resulting in increasing polarization and 
lower economic cohesion across Europe (López-Bazo et al., 1999).   13 
 
Our analysis of the evolution of European regional disparities since 1989 confirms the 
absence of convergence, regardless of the method used to analyse regional change. 
Figure 2.1 plots the evolution of the nationally weighted
5 standard deviation of 
regional GDP measured in PPS in the EU (with the exception of Germany), and in the 
four countries of the Union with the largest number of Objective 1 regions: Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The general trend is towards greater divergence in three of 
the four countries analysed and in the EU as a whole. In the whole of the EU, the 
standard deviation increased by 20.2% since 1989. The greatest increase in regional 
disparities took place after the implementation of the Single Market in 1993, and is in 
part the consequence of the change in the regional division in the UK, which accounts 
for about three fifths of the increase in disparities. However even if this fact is taken 
into account, there is a considerable growth in the standard deviation in Europe. 
Between 1994 and 1999 – when the regional sample does not change – it exceeds 8%.  
 
Insert Figure 2.1 around here 
 
Greece, Italy, and Spain also experience a rise in regional disparities which seems cut 
by the same cloth as the evolution of regional disparities in the EU: stability and even 
slight decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by a sharp increase in 
disparities in the second half of the 1990s. The greatest growth in disparities takes 
place in Spain, where the standard deviation in GDP per capita grew by 15.7% 
between 1988 and 1999, followed by Greece and Italy with an increase of 11.7% and 
1.8% respectively (although in Italy disparities increase by 6.3% if only the period 
                                                 
5 All data is standardised nationally in order to minimise the problems of spatial 
autocorrelation (See Annex 2 for an explanation).   14 
between 1991 and 1999 is considered). Only Portugal, with a 0.6% decline in regional 
disparities that mainly took place during the first half of the 1990s, goes in an 
opposite direction.  
 
We have also conducted cross-section unconditional beta convergence analyses using 
the traditional Barro and Sala-i-Martín (1992) approach in a variety of ways: 
including all the EU Nuts II regions or just with the original Objective 1 subset and 
controlling and not controlling for spatial autocorrelation. The results indicate the 
existence of slow regional absolute convergence for the period 1989-1999, whenever 
national growth rates are not considered. The rate of convergence is of 1.3% per 
annum (Table 2.1, Model 1). If however national growth is introduced in the model in 
order to minimise possible problems of spatial autocorrelation the rate of convergence 
becomes insignificant, confirming that whatever convergence exists at a regional level 
in the EU is the result of national growth patterns rather than of any universal 
tendency towards higher growth in lagging regions (Table 2.1, Model 2) (Esteban, 
1994; Rodríguez-Pose, 1998; European Commission, 2001: 4; Puga, 2002).  
 
Insert Table 2.1 around here 
 
In contrast, if we take just the original Objective 1 regions into account, the panorama 
is slightly different. There is a significant rate of regional convergence of 4.3 and 3% 
respectively when regional growth is regressed on the original GDP per capita and 
when national growth levels during the period of analysis are included in the model 
(Table 2.1, Models 3 and 4). These results point in the direction of the existence of 
convergence clubs among lagging European regions (Neven and Gouyette, 1995;   15 
López-Bazo et al, 1999) and are in tune with those reported by the European 
Commission (2001) in the Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. 
 
Finally, we performed a convergence analysis with panel data, using the same variants 
as in the cross-sectional analysis. We include the regional rate of growth GDP per 
capita with a two-year lag (lag2 GDP) as a further independent variable. This variable 
is preferred to the same one with a one-year lag (lag1 GDP) in order to avoid 
problems of endogeneity, since lag1 GDP had been used to compute the growth rate. 
 
The results of the panel convergence analysis indicate an absolute lack of 
convergence both at EU level, as well as within Objective 1. In both cases the 
coefficient is positive and not significant (Table 2.2, Models 1 and 2). When the 
national growth rate is introduced in the models in order to minimise the risk of 
spatial autocorrelation, the convergence coefficient for the set of European regions is 
also positive and not significant (Table 2.2, Model 3). In the Objective 1 regions 
subset it is, in contrast, significant and negative. The magnitude of the observed 
convergence within this subgroup is, however, extremely low: 1.36*10
-06, that is a 
1000€ difference in GDP per capita in the original year leads to a higher annual 
growth rate of 0.136% (Table 2.2, Model 4).  
 
Insert Table 2.2 around here 
 
The convergence analyses have highlighted, first, that, when taking national growth 
into account, there has been no regional convergence in the EU after the 
implementation of the reform of the Structural funds and, second, that only slow 
convergence seems to be happening in the subset of Objective 1 regions.    16 
 
3. The impact of the Structural Funds on regional growth 
 
But, to what extent can the lack of regional convergence across European regions be 
attributed to the lack of capacity of the regional development expenditure in Objective 
1 regions to generate economic convergence? Assessing whether European regional 
development funds have an impact on economic growth is a tricky issue, since many 
other policy, social, economic, institutional, and cultural factors – in many cases 
difficult to control – have an influence on economic performance. We will therefore 
limit ourselves to establishing the simplest connection between the Structural Funds 
commitments in Objective 1 regions and regional growth across Europe, by 
conducting a regression model in which regional growth during the period 1989-99 is 
regressed on the initial GDP per capita (lnGDP 1989) and on the amount of 
expenditure commitments on Objective 1 support (Total Regional Funds), measured 
as a percentage of GDP in that same period. The model is performed for the whole set 
of European NUTS II regions (Table 3.1, Models 1 and 2) and for the Objective 1 
subset (Table 3.1, Models 3 and 4). In addition we add national growth rates (Real 
National Growth) in some of the models in order to reduce the risk of spatial 
autocorrelation (Table 3.1, Models 2 and 4).  
 
Insert Table 3.1 around here 
 
Using this type of analysis, the results point to a very weak but positive and 
significant impact of European Structural Funds on regional growth across Europe. 
The impact is greater when the whole set of European regions in considered than 
when just Objective 1 regions are taken into account (Table 3.1).   17 
 
However, if the Structural Funds allocation is divided into its regional and 
multiregional components, the weak but positive and significant association between 
Structural Fund Objective 1 commitments and regional growth in Objective 1 regions 
disappears. As shown in Table 3.2, after regressing the growth of GDP per capita on 
Structural Funds commitments in the whole set and in Objective 1 regions using panel 
data, there is no significant statistical relation between the European development 
effort and regional growth. This result holds both for funds allocated on an exclusive 
regional basis and for multiregional commitments. Since the commitments of the 
Structural Funds are however unlikely to lead to immediate returns in terms of 
regional growth, we repeat the regression using annual lags and allowing for a 
maximum of six years between the regional expenditure and its impact on growth 
(Table 3.2 reports the results for the current year and years 4 and 7). In none of the six 
annual lags the regression coefficient for the regional or the multiregional 
commitments is statistically significant, highlighting that no real positive association 
between Structural Funds and regional growth can be detected in a period of six years 
following the initial investment.  
 
Insert Table 3.2 around here 
 
4. Unbalanced development strategies and regional growth. 
Why have the Structural Funds so far had such a limited impact on regional 
convergence? There are multiple factors that might explain why despite the 
multiplication of funds available for regional development since the reform of the 
Structural Funds there is little or no evidence of greater economic cohesion and   18 
convergence across regions in the EU. Some of these explanations bear no connection 
with the reform of European development policies. The main one is that the process 
of economic integration across Europe may be favouring the concentration of 
economic activity in the core of Europe, by fostering the formation of greater 
agglomeration economies in the core and leading to the concentration of high-value 
added scale intensive activities in a few regions (Brülhart and Torstensson, 1996; 
Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000). The periphery thus becomes increasingly specialised 
in low-value added manufacturing and non market-oriented services. The relatively 
low legal migration across European regions and the deceleration in the shift from 
agricultural to non-agricultural jobs are also at the root of the slowdown in regional 
convergence in Europe (Cuadrado-Roura et al., 2000)  
 
Other explanations highlight the distortionary effects of other policies. It has been 
argued by Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) that national policies aimed at the 
protection of certain strategic firms or industrial sectors can provoke distortions which 
in some cases may contribute to counter the cohesive effects of European 
development policies. The territorial concentration in core countries and regions of 
the benefits of other European policies – and especially of the CAP, which represents 
almost half of the European budget (De la Fuente and Doménech, 2001: 323; 
European Commission, 2001: 84) – may further dilute the impact of development 
policies. 
 
A third group of possible explanations points directly to development policy related 
issues. First, it may be argued that, since development strategies always have a 
medium to long-term effect, it may still be too early to accurately assess the impact of   19 
the reform of the Structural Funds. A second contention along this line is that, despite 
the increase in the volume of development funds, the funds available are still too 
scarce to have any significant impact on growth rates. With Objective 1 funds 
averaging 1.74% of the GDP of Objective 1 regions, and with the total European 
development support not exceeding in the best of cases 3.5 to 4% of the GDP of the 
poorest regions, it could be claimed that current development support does not suffice 
to counter the imbalances generated by market forces and economic integration. From 
this point of view, the European development funds could be perceived more as a 
means of preventing further divergence, rather than as a way to achieve greater 
cohesion. 
 
In this paper we focus however on an alternative explanation. It concerns the 
development strategy of Objective 1 regions and the way in which European funds are 
spent. We argue that the distribution of funds among the main development axes 
described in section 1 may not be the most adequate strategy to generate medium and 
long-term growth, but rather an instrument fundamentally targeted at achieving short-
term results, and therefore more adept at delivering assistance or income support 
rather than a genuine development strategy. 
 
As mentioned in Section 1, about half of all Objective 1 funds have committed to the 
development of infrastructure, transport networks, and the environment. Business and 
tourism support represented a bit less than a quarter. The question is to what extent is 
this distribution of European Objective 1 funds across development axes impinging 
on their capacity to deliver greater economic cohesion. In order to check how the 
unbalanced structure of Objective 1 funds affects regional economic growth, we have   20 
regressed the commitments in each of the four development axes described in section 
1 (support to agriculture and rural promotion [A]; business and tourism support [B]; 
investment in education and human capital [H]; and investment in infrastructure, 
transport networks, and the environment [I]), calculated as a percentage of the 
regional GDP measured in PPS, on regional growth. We have conducted a cross-
section and panel data analysis, using annual lags, in order to capture not only static 
effects, but also to measure the evolution of the coefficients in time. The classification 
of regional commitments comes from our revision of the CSFs and the regional Ops 
for all Objective 1 regions, with the exception of the Länder of the former East 
Germany. 
 
A number of structural variables are added to the model because of their theoretical 
importance and statistical significance and represent proxies for the functioning of 
regional labour market and for the socio-economic and production structures. The 
functioning of the labour market is represented by a combination of employment rate 
and youth unemployment rates. It is usually assumed that a high level of labour 
participation is a symptom of efficient use of available resources. Hence, societies 
with high levels of employment are considered to have a greater growth potential. 
Most Objective 1 regions are, however, characterised by relatively low employment 
rates in the western European context. The youth unemployment rate is a further 
signal of whether labour markets are capable of assimilating the full potential of local 
and regional human resources. Since younger generations tend on average to have a 
higher level of education than the overall working population, the ability or inability 
to integrate new and potentially more skilled workers into the labour force is an   21 
indication of the rigidity of local markets. Most Objective 1 regions feature high 
youth unemployment rates. 
 
The female employment rate is taken as a proxy of the functioning of local labour 
markets and of the regional socio-economic structure. Female participation denotes 
not just another aspect of the fulfilment of human capital potential in the labour 
market, but also of the role of women in society. Most Objective 1 regions are 
characterised by low female employment levels. Finally, the high relative level of 
employment in the primary sector of most of the original Objective 1 regions has 
driven us to select agricultural employment as proxy of the production structure. All 
these variables, with the exception of agricultural employment, were significantly 
associated with regional growth rates during the period of analysis in preliminary 
regressions.  
 
The model adopts the following form: 
} ln , , , , , , , , { 0 GDP agremp fememp yunem emp I H B A f yi,t =         (1) 
where: 
y is the nationally weighted growth of regional GDP per capita measured in PPS; 
A are the annual financial commitments for the support of agriculture and rural 
promotion, as a percentage of regional GDP; 
B are the annual financial commitments targeted at business and tourism support, as a 
percentage of regional GDP; 
H are the annual financial commitments in the fields of education and the 
redeployment of human capital, as a percentage of regional GDP;   22 
I are the annual financial commitments targeted at infrastructure, transportation 
networks, and the environment, as a percentage of regional GDP;  
emp is the regional rate of employment; 
yunem is the regional rate of youth unemployment; 
fememp is the regional rate of female employment; 
agremp is the regional rate of employment in the primary sector and 
lnGDP0 is the average regional GDP per capita during the first programming period. 
 
In order to minimise the risk of spatial autocorrelation the dependent variable and all 
structural variables are weighted nationally (see Annex 2). In the panel data analysis, 
all structural variables are introduced in the model with a one-year lag as a way to 
avoid problems of simultaneous causation.  
 
The cross-section analysis is conducted by averaging the panel data in time. It is 
therefore more similar to a between estimator than to a ‘real’ cross-section. The 
analysis is performed for three different periods: the 1
st programming period, 1989-93 
(models 1 and 4); the 2
nd, 1994-9 (models 2 and 5) and the whole period together, 
1989-99 (models 3 and 6) both for all NUTS II regions and for all regions that 
belonged to Objective 1 at any time during the period of analysis. In addition, in order 
to identify longer term effects, the relative regional economic performance of the 
second programming period was regressed on the Structural Funds expenditure and 
the structural variables of the first programming period, both including (models 9 and 
10) and not including (models 7 and 8) the average regional GDP per capita for the 
first programming period (Initial GDP). The results are reported in Table 4.1. 
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Insert Table 4.1 around here 
 
Although the coefficients and significance of variables vary across models, some 
common features emerge. Of the structural variables, total employment and youth 
unemployment tend to be negatively associated to economic growth. The coefficient 
of female employment generally displays a positive sign, whereas that of employment 
in the primary sector varies. In contrast to preliminary analyses in which these 
variables were individually regressed on growth, the coefficients tend to be not 
significant across models (Table 4.1).  
 
Of the expenditure variables, expenditure in human capital (H) is positive in ten out of 
ten and significant at the 5% level in seven out of the ten models. Agriculture support 
(A) is positive in all models that search for an immediate or short-term association 
between the support to this development axis and economic growth (Models 1 to 6). 
This positive association is, however, only significant at the 5% level in Objective 1 
regions during the second programming period (Model 5). In contrast, in the longer 
term, the relationship between economic growth and agriculture support becomes 
more complex, as depicted by models 7 through 10. When all regions are considered, 
the pattern is similar to that described for the contemporaneous models: a positive but 
non-significant association (Models 7 and 9). If only Objective 1 regions are taken 
into account, the coefficient changes sign becoming significant at the 10% level when 
the initial GDP per capita is included in the model (Model 10). The connection 
between regional growth and business and tourism support (B) tends to be positive 
and non-significant during the first programming period (Models 1 and 4), becoming 
negative and significant for the second and the whole period of analysis (Models 2-3 
and 5-6). In the models that regress regional growth in the second period on the   24 
variables of the first period, the coefficient becomes positive – with the exception of 
Model 10 – but not significant (Models 7 through 10). The coefficient for 
infrastructure and environment support (I) tends to be not significant and is negative 
in eight out of ten cases. In the two cases where the coefficients are significant – 
models 3 and 6 at the 10% level – the coefficients are negative (Table 4.1). 
 
The panel data analysis presents us with a more dynamic picture of the connection 
between regional growth and Objective 1 commitments
6. The panel data analysis is 
conducted for all regions that belonged to Objective 1 at any moment during the 
period of analysis (with the exception, once again, of the former East German Länder) 
using the pooled estimator
7. The association between Structural Fund commitments 
and regional growth is measured for the year of implementation and seven successive 
years, in order to capture the evolution in time of the effects of Objective 1 
commitments on regional growth. The results of the regression are reported in Table 
4.2.  
 
Insert Table 4.2 around here 
 
The results are in strong conformity with those of the cross-section analysis. A 
defined pattern emerges. First, regional commitments to agricultural support and rural 
                                                 
6 It has to be borne in mind that a panel data analysis covering a period of only 11 
years could pick up short run cyclical, instead of long run effects. However, the 
harmony between the panel data and the cross-section data analysis highlight the fact 
that cyclical distortions may be relatively unimportant in this case. In addition, in 
order to avoid problems of residual correlations, the lagged GDP per capita of the 
regions is left outside of the analysis, although its introduction did not change the 
results obtained. 
 
7  Which according to the Breutsch and Pagan test is more suitable, since the 
individual (fixed) effects are not significant.   25 
restructuring (A) have a positive and significant immediate effect on economic 
growth in Objective 1 regions. The positive impact however withers away almost 
immediately and in later years the coefficient becomes strongly negative, albeit not 
significant (Table 4.2). This pattern of immediate positive effect on growth and 
waning and even negative returns as time progresses represents the archetype of funds 
that tend to fulfil an income support rather than a sustainable development role. From 
this perspective, the agricultural and rural support axis in Objective 1 regions can be 
regarded as an instrument – as the CAP has to a greater or lesser extent become – of 
ensuring that farmers and rural dwellers are rewarded for their general contribution to 
society and for their role in maintaining the environment and preserving Europe’s 
rural heritage (European Commission, 1997), rather than as a part of a strategy to 
promote sustainable development. Hence, it is no surprise that the medium-term 
returns to this type of commitments are insignificant and even negative.  
 
The returns to the two main axes of the Objective 1 development strategy are also 
disappointing. The development of infrastructure, transportation networks, and the 
protection of the environment (I), and business and tourism support (B) make up 
together about three quarters of Objective 1 intervention. Yet commitments in these 
two development axes appear to have little or no short or medium-term impact on 
regional economic growth, as indicated by the lack of significance of any of the 
coefficients (Table 4.2). The lack of returns of business investment may be related to 
the deficient competitiveness of many existing businesses in Objective 1 regions. A 
large percentage of this type of interventions is targeted either at the development of 
small and medium sized enterprises that will have to operate in relatively difficult 
economic and institutional contexts and that often lack the capacity and the know-how   26 
to compete in open markets, or to the support of larger firms whose comparative 
advantages and prospects are rather bleak. In either case the medium and long-term 
returns of this sort of support are likely to be weak and often dependent on changes in 
the local environment. 
 
The absence of returns of investment in infrastructure (I) in Objective 1 regions 
(Table 4.2) may be related to several factors. First, the impact of infrastructure 
investment on economic activity is never immediate and requires a considerable lapse 
of time for the full impact to be felt (Vanhoudt et al., 2000). It may thus be argued 
that the span of our panel data analysis is too short a period to evaluate the full effects 
of infrastructure investment in Objective 1 regions. Second, annual commitments may 
not be the best way of evaluating the full impact of the infrastructural effort in 
Objective 1 regions. However, as the cross-section analysis showed, especially when 
growth during the second programming period was regressed on regional 
commitments during the first period (Models 7 through 10 in Table 4.1), no impact 
was evident. Finally, the lack of impact of infrastructure investment may be due to the 
fact that building roads, railways, airports, telecommunication infrastructure, 
sanitation systems, and recuperating the environment, while improving the quality of 
life of the inhabitants of the regions benefiting from this sort of investment – and 
being highly popular and visible activities and, thus, very attractive for politicians 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2000) – does not by itself suffice to generate the economic 
dynamism and the firms that will benefit from greater accessibility and improvements 
in the environment. Since, as noted by Martin (1998, 1999) and Puga (2002), roads, 
railways, and telecommunication networks run in two directions, a strategy strongly 
skewed towards the development of infrastructure in regions with relatively   27 
vulnerable local production structures, weak entrepreneurship levels and 
technological base, and an often weaker human capital endowment, may solve an 
important development bottleneck and reduce the infrastructural gap with the rest of 
the EU, but may leave these regions more exposed to competition from stronger and 
more technologically advanced firms in core areas. Spain provides an example of 
where this mechanism may already be at work. The strong recent investment on 
transport infrastructure in Spanish Objective 1 regions – which to a large extent has 
been devoted to the construction of road and high-speed rail links between the 
periphery of the country and Madrid – has probably helped to boost the phenomenal 
growth rates that Madrid has experienced in the second half of the 1990s, but has left 
many of the Objective 1 regions, whose economic prospects the new roads and rail-
links were supposed to increase, struggling to catch-up. Accordingly the 
consequences of such an unbalanced development strategy for lagging regions may 
not be the lofty economic returns predicted by Aschauer (1989), but more the absence 
of a connection between infrastructure investment and regional convergence 
identified by Vanhoudt et al. (2000), Puga (2002) and in this paper. 
 
The only development axis with short and medium-term positive (and significant or 
close to significant) returns is investment in human capital (H) (Table 4.2). Objective 
1 regions harbour serious labour market problems. They either have a shortage of 
skills, or experience problems of a mismatch between educational supply and labour 
demand, since “the evidence suggests that matching the available skills of the work 
force with those required by an economy undergoing fundamental change has become 
a major problem” (European Commission, 2001: xxvi). Moreover, an important 
percentage of the potential of the regional labour force tends to be under-utilised.   28 
Human capital problems are accentuated by the lack of mobility of European 
population in recent decades (Puga, 1999). In this context of inadequate human capital 
provision and low labour mobility, the less than fifteen percent of the Objective 1 
funds supporting education and the redeployment of human capital have the highest 
and longer lasting returns (Table 4.2). Such a finding is in tune with recent studies 
(i.e. Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2002; Overman and Puga, 2002), which highlight 
the importance of the educational attainment of the population in the economic 
potential of a region and suggest the need of redirecting the focus of supply-side 
development policies from more traditional areas to education, skills, and human 
capital. 
 
As a whole, the results of the analysis argue in favour of a profound revision of 
current development strategies across lagging regions in Europe; strategies based on a 
greater consideration of the place-specific regional characteristics that are at the root 
of the development problems of these regions (Ioannides and Petrakos, 2000; Thisse, 
2000). The results also partially conform to those reported by De la Fuente and Vives 
(1995) when analysing the impact of supply-oriented development policies. As in 
their case, we find that public supply-side development strategies play a role – albeit 
small in the European case – in achieving greater territorial cohesion, and that, in 
general, investment in education makes a greater contribution to the reduction in 
regional inequality than investment in infrastructure. But, in contrast to their findings, 
we cannot infer a link between the size of the redistributive effort affects its impact on 
regional growth and disparities. Our results seem to point in the direction that size 
only matters if the regional development strategy is adequate and adapted to the needs 




In this paper we have examined to what extent the complete overhaul of the European 
development policies since the reform of the Structural Funds is succeeding in 
achieving its objectives of greater economic and social cohesion and of a reduction in 
regional disparities across the EU. Our analysis has focused on the impact of the 
Structural Funds allocated to Objective 1 regions, which represent more than two 
thirds of the Structural Funds and more than 61% of the total EU development effort. 
In many ways, the Structural Funds have played an important role. The fact that, in a 
period when we have witnessed a strong geographical concentration of corporate and 
R&D activity in core areas of Europe, regional disparities have remained more or less 
stable may be considered as possible evidence of the contribution of the Structural 
Funds to preventing the growth of regional disparities within the EU. The Structural 
Funds may have also had an impact on overall growth (i.e. through contributing to 
growth outside Objective 1 regions). Unfortunately the objective given to the 
Structural Funds by European legislators goes well beyond the genesis of growth and 
the prevention of divergence and includes the delivery of greater economic cohesion 
and convergence. On this ambitious count, the results of the analysis underscore that 
the EU is not only still far away from its aim of greater economic and social cohesion, 
but also that the doubts about the capacity of the development funds allocated to 
lagging regions in Europe to deliver sustainable economic growth and to reduce the 
gap between the European core and the periphery seem to be well founded.  
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Although many factors may be behind the relative failure of lagging regions to catch-
up, in this paper we have established a link between the structure of the regional 
development strategies financed by European funds and the lack of regional 
convergence across western Europe. Development strategies in Objective 1 regions 
have been skewed towards infrastructure and business support. However, the results 
of the cross-sectional and panel data regression analyses underline that investment in 
these development axes has so far had a negligible impact on regional convergence 
both across the whole of the EU and if only Objective 1 regions are taken into 
consideration. 
 
The investment in agricultural support and rural restructuring presents a profile which 
is closer to that of an income support strategy than a of a sustainable development 
policies. While the impact of this sort of support on economic growth is positive in 
the very short-term, the positive influence wanes in time and becomes progressively 
negative. The only medium-term positive influence detected is that of the funds 
targeted at education and the development of human capital. Regardless of the method 
of analysis used, the connection between the share of funds aimed at improving the 
local endowment of human capital and economic performance tends to be positive 
and often significant, with the association being stable in time. 
 
The prescription of this paper is thus that any future revision of European 
development policies – which looks increasingly likely as a result of the enlargement 
of the EU – should take into consideration the risks associated with an excessive focus 
on only one development axis, often responding to political or national interests, in 
what are vulnerable economic contexts. As we have seen, these strategies not only do   31 
not deliver higher economic growth in the short and medium terms, but may be also 
failing to prepare assisted regions to face the economic challenges ahead, leaving 
them as – if not more – vulnerable to future competition as they were before the 
support started. Hence, there is a need to rethink regional policy along the lines of the 
implementation of more innovative and region-specific development strategies which 
would imply a more locally tailored combination of investment priorities across axes, 
therefore avoiding some of the risks of premature exposure to the market (linked to an 
emphasis on infrastructure), brain drain (human resources), or subsidizing non 
competitive local firms (business supports). In addition, the European Union has a 
role in contributing to making local institutions more capable and accountable, as one 
of the lessons of the past years is that the delivery of development strategies has 
proved difficult because of administrative constraints in complying with the principles 
of EU regional policy effectively. This route may need to be followed if the European 
development policies are to become true sustainable development strategies and, thus, 
more capable of delivering in their objective of achieving greater economic and social 




The European Statistical Office (EUROSTAT) is the main source for data used in this 
paper. Regional GDP data and all the structural labour market and employment data 
stem from this source. 
 
The Structural Fund database used in the analysis was constructed by the authors from 
the CSFs for the programming periods 1989-93 and 1994-9 and from the annual 
reports on the implementation of the reform of the Structural Funds. Unfortunately the 
breakdown by year and region was not always easily available. In the few cases – all 
before 1994 – for which only national, instead of regional, breakdowns of 
commitments are available, we have used the breakdown of the ERDF (which is by 
far the most important financial instrument in Objective 1) as a proxy for the overall 
regional quotas of all the Structural Funds. In a handful of cases concerning 1992 and 
1993 for which no data were found, the regional commitment quotas were assumed to 
be equal to the average of the period 1989-91. In the case of Greece, EU transfers to 
municipalities were used instead for 1992 and 1993.  
 
The inexistence of reliable Structural Fund expenditure data led us to choose data for 
commitments
8. We assume that Structural Funds commitments and expenditure are 
                                                 
8 The Commission has been severely criticised by the European Court of Auditors 
(2002) for its inability to produce accounts for Structural Fund expenditure. In its 
2002 report, the Court found that for the programming period 1989-1994 “the 
procedures for examining final payment requests still took the form of   33 
strongly correlated. This creates some problems, especially in terms of the distribution 
over time of expenditure, as considerable lags between the commitment of Structural 
Funds and actual expenditure often take place.  
 
For the calculation of the annual commitments to the four different development axes 
(A, B, H, I) we resorted, for the period 1994-9, to the re-elaboration of the operation 
projects (available in the Inforegio website [www.inforegio.cec.eu.int]), according to 
the criteria described in the text. For the period 1989-93 only the CSFs were available. 
Since no regional breakdown exists in this period for Portugal and Greece, we 
presuppose that regional commitment quotas across the four development axes are 
equal to the national quota. In addition, no annual breakdown of commitment quotas 
is available. Therefore it is assumed that the quotas remain stable during the 
programming periods changing only from 1994 onwards. The annual commitment to 
A, B, H, I is calculated as product of the quota and the annual commitment for the 
region. 
 
The commitments are only available in nominal terms. We assume that the impact of 
1 nominal Euro in regions with different level of prices is not the same. Hence, in 
order to obtain the percentages of expenditure (our independent variables), we divided 
the nominal commitments by the total GDP pps, and not by the nominal GDP. 
 
Our dependent variable is the real growth rate of GDP per capita. This is calculated by 
using national deflators on the nominal growth rates of GDP pps. We used national 
                                                                                                                                            
interdepartmental consultations, and respective responsibilities had not been amended 
since the previous period” (p. 98) and that 549 files corresponding to that period were 
still open (p. 99).   34 
deflators, because regional deflators were not readily available for all regions and for 
the whole period of analysis. Given that the calculation of pps is done on a national 
basis, the use of national deflators is not expected to create significant distortions. 
  
Since, in order to minimise the problems of spatial autocorrelation, we frequently 
resort to nationally standardised variables (see Annex 2 for a more detailed 
explanation), countries with just one region (Luxembourg, Ireland, and Denmark) 
were excluded from the parts of the analysis were these variables are used. German 
regions are also not considered in the analysis, as a consequence of the high volatility 
in regional growth rates (especially in the eastern Länder) after re-unification. Such 
changes would have provoked huge alterations in the analysis, especially bearing in 
mind that in the rest of the EU nothing of comparable importance happened. The 
regions of the remaining fourteen countries of the EU make up the database.  
 
Finally, the French overseas departments are also excluded from the analysis for a 
twofold reason: first, the information concerning these regions is often scarce, and, 
second, because we believe that, due to their geographical location, the factors 
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Annex 2  
Spatial autocorrelation   
 
Recent studies of the evolution of regional disparities in Europe have tended to 
highlight the existence of a serious problem of spatial autocorrelation, that is a lack of 
independence among observations representing neighbouring regions (Armstrong, 
1995; Quah, 1996). Our analysis is no exception as significant national effects 
appeared in preliminary models. Tests of the influence of national growth rates on 
regional growth, by adding the lagged dependent variable and the national growth 
parameter to preliminary models always produced results that were close to 1 and 
significant. These results implied that regional growth in the EU was extremely 
affected by national growth rates, i.e.: regions within a same country tend to grow at 
similar rates. 
 
 In order to minimise the problems of spatial autocorrelation in the error term and the 
distortions it generates on models we decided to transform in most of our models – 
following a variant of the system used by Rodríguez-Pose (1999) – the dependent 
variable and the structural independent variables into nationally weighted variables. 


















y                (2) 
where ri y  denotes the nationally weighted variable in region r in time i, and y the 
original variable. r and c stand for region and country respectively. 
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Figure 2.1. The evolution of standard deviation of regional GDP per capita in the 


























































































Community Expenditure  1980 1985 1989  1993  1997 2001 
       
Percentages of outturn in payments:       
EAGGF Guarantee Section (C.A.P.)  68.6 68.4 57.7  52.4  49.6 46.1 
Development Funds  11.0 12.8 18.8  30.7  32.3 33.2 
— Of which: Cohesion Fund  0.0 0.0 0.0  1.2  2.9 2.6 
— Of which: Structural Fund  11.0 12.8 18.8  29.5  29.4 30.6 
Other  20.4 18.7 23.5  17.0  18.1 20.7 
             
Community Expenditure as % of Community GDP  0.8 0.92 0.94  1.18  1.12 1.09 
Expenditure per capita (EUR)  62.7 105.2 129.5  191.1  217.1 255.2 
             
Development funds on EU GDP (%)  0.09 0.12 0.18  0.36  0.36 0.36 
Structural Funds per capita (EUR 2000 prices)  13.63 21.09 32.21  69.17  75.80 83.40 
       
(data for 2001 are provisional)       
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Table 1.2 
 
Structural fund commitments in Objective 1 regions (% of nominal values) 
 
 
1989-93  1994-99 
COUNTRY 
A  B  H  I  TOTAL  A  B  H  I  TOTAL 
Austria   -  -  -  -  -  15.0  68.7 16.3  0.0  100 
Belgium   -  -  -  -  -  0.0  66.2 17.2  16.6  100 
France (except Overseas dep.)  28.6 15.9  10.1  45.4  100  9.6  32.8 18.7  39.0  100 
Greece  11.2 18.4  16.6  53.8  100  18.7  13.4 13.6  54.3  100 
Ireland   14.7 33.7  26.4  25.2  100  0.0  54.7 3.8  41.4  100 
Italy  14.4 35.0  1.9  48.8  100  21.0  21.3 27.0  30.7  100 
Netherlands   -  -  -  -  -  22.2  20.4 21.0  36.4  100 
Portugal  11.5 6.1  35.3  47.2  100  0.0  15.2 8.6  76.1  100 
Spain  26.7 13.2  8.8  51.4  100  0.6  14.3 7.5  77.6  100 
UK  10.5 38.1  20.9  30.4  100  12.2  25.0 33.1  29.7  100 
Total  17.6 21.1  16.3  45.0  100  7.0  24.0 12.1  56.8  100 
 The 5.9% of total funds not easily ascribable to any of these categories has been omitted  
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Table 2.1  
 
Cross-section unconditional ß convergence analysis (1989-99) 
 
Regression  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
             
Regions included:  All regions  All regions  Objective 1  Objective 1 
         
Number of obs.  152  152  44  44 
F  13.17  50.69  24.82  14.84 
Prob>F  0.0004  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R
2  0.0746  0.4049  0.3606  0.4084 
Adj. R
2  0.01157  0.3969  0.3461  0.3809 
         
GDP 1989 standardised*   -0.01356  0.00016  -0.04194  -0.02958 
significance  0.000  0.961  0.000  0.007 
         
Annual national growth    not included  0.92836  not included  0.51758 
significance  0.000    0.069 
         
Constant  0.06083  0.00242  0.09424  0.05398 
significance  0.000  0.737  0.000  0.024 
              
 
* See Annex 2 for an explanation of the standardisation methods.   44 
Table 2.2  
 
Panel unconditional ß convergence analysis (1989-99) 
 
Panel unconditional ß convergence (period 1989-99) 
  [1]    [2]    [3]    [4]   
Regions  All  Objective 1    All    Objective 1  
                 
Observations  1348   414   1348   414  
Groups  162   47   162   47  
Average obs. per group  8.32   8.81   8.32   8.81  
                 
R-sq:  within  0.0075   0.0195   0.1822   0.1571  
between  0.0034   0.0887   0.1683   0.1012  
overall  0.0018   0.0001   0.1773   0.1503  
                 
  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig. 
                 
Real National Growth          0.9905  0.000  1.0430  0.000
                 
lag2 GDP  3.48E-07  0.123 2.05E-07  0.809  5.48E-08  0.790  -1.36E-06  0.090
                 
Constant  0.0120  0.001 0.0148  0.121  -0.0012  0.728  0.0128  0.144
                 
Breusch and Pagan LM test           
chi
2  3.17   0.54   1.76   0.25  
Prob > chi
2  0.0752   0.4634   0.1842   0.6158  
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Table 3.1 
 
The link between European Structural Fund support in Objective 1 regions and regional 
growth. Cross-sectional analysis 
 
Dependent variable: growth in the period 1989-99 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
 
Sample  All  All Objective 1  Objective 1
         
Observations  152  152 46  46
F  15.3  34.61 13.93  10.79
P>F  0  0 0  0
         
R-squared  0.1704  0.4123 0.3931  0.4352
Adj. R-squared  0.1593  0.4004 0.3649  0.3949
         
GDP 1989  -4.58E-06  7.32E-06 -6.34E-05  -4.01E-05
significance  0.431  0.155 0.002  0.083
Total Regional Funds  0.1213  0.0812 0.0706  0.073
significance  0.000  0.002 0.068  0.054
Real National Growth    0.8789  0.5407
significance    0.000   0.084
Constant  0.6226  -0.0452 1.1823  0.5976
significance  0.000  0.675 0.000  0.121
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Table 3.2  
 
The link between European Structural Fund support and regional growth. Panel data analysis for the whole set and Objective 1 regions 
 
  All regions          Objective 1 regions        
                         
Lag  No Lag  No Lag  Lag3  Lag3  Lag6  Lag6  No Lag  No Lag  Lag3  Lag3  Lag6  Lag6 
                         
Estimator 
Pooled  
(GLS)  LSDV 
Pooled  
(GLS)  LSDV 
Pooled  
(GLS)  LSDV 
Pooled  
(GLS)  LSDV 
Pooled  
(GLS)  LSDV 
Pooled  
(GLS)  LSDV 
                  
Observations  1662 1662 1266 1266  810  810  507  507  373  373  235  235 
Groups  162 162 162 162  162  162  47  47  47  47  47  47 
Avg. obs. per group  10.26 10.26 7.81 7.81  5  5  10.79  10.79  7.94  7.94  5  5 
                         
R
2  within  0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001  0.000  0.004  0.001  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.010 
between  0.016 0.015 0.018 0.009 0.014  0.021  0.117  0.111  0.148  0.139  0.132  0.093 
overall  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002  0.001  0.004  0.001  0.016  0.016  0.020  0.003 
                         
Regional funds  
(% of GDP)  0.043  -0.333  0.227  0.176  0.014  -0.692  0.116  -0.333  0.325  0.176  0.108  -0.692 
Significance  0.744  0.128  0.168  0.565  0.955  0.137  0.452  0.176  0.085  0.606  0.694  0.174 
                         
Multiregional funds  
(% of GDP)  -0.028  0.172  -0.013  0.362  0.498  0.120  0.209  0.172  0.371  0.362  1.154  0.120 
Significance  0.881  0.643  0.959  0.472  0.268  0.915  0.407  0.680  0.259  0.519  0.060  0.922 
                         
Constant  -0.054 -0.003 -0.100 -0.162 -0.178  0.035  -0.437  -0.033  -0.673  -0.549  -0.903  0.268 
significance  0.510 0.981 0.322 0.289 0.231  0.894  0.073  0.931  0.021  0.268  0.038  0.762 
                                        47
Table 4.1. 
 
Commitments to the four development axes regressed on regional growth. Cross-section analysis. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
SAMPLE  All regions  All regions  All regions  Objective 1  Objective 1  Objective 1  All regions  Objective 1  All regions  Objective 1 
Period  1989-1993  1994-1999  1989-1999  1989-1993  1994-1999  1989-1999  2 on 1     2 on 1     2 on 1     2 on 1    
                                         
Number of obs  106    162    162    44    47    47    162    47    152    46   
F  1.47    4.66    4.39    1.65    3.63    4.24    2.55    1.56    2.08    1.54   
Prob > F  0.1786    0    0.0001    0.1472    0.0032    0.0011    0.0122    0.1698    0.0354    0.1719   
R
2  0.108    0.1959    0.1865    0.2734    0.433    0.4714    0.1178    0.2472    0.1163    0.2778   
Adj R
2  0.0345    0.1538    0.144    0.1074    0.3137    0.3601    0.0717    0.0887    0.0603    0.0973   
                                         
  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig. 
                                         
emp  -2.837 0.215  0.001 0.999  -0.025 0.981  -10.038 0.034  -4.835 0.161  -5.796 0.012  -0.365 0.841  -10.673 0.032  -0.082 0.967  -14.364 0.014 
unemp  -0.653 0.171  -0.680 0.115  -0.351 0.155  -1.648 0.064  -1.278 0.131  -1.165 0.019  -0.560 0.234  -2.276 0.052  -0.703 0.158  -2.711 0.029 
fememp  2.727 0.037  -0.315 0.838  0.581 0.555  5.976 0.014  0.926 0.739  2.763 0.089  0.116 0.941  3.300 0.275  0.079 0.961  4.034 0.192 
agremp  0.048 0.779  -0.531 0.000  -0.245 0.010  0.069 0.857  -0.456 0.102  -0.109 0.531  -0.480 0.002  -0.148 0.655  -0.516 0.008  0.321 0.505 
                                         
A  2.347 0.292  2.141 0.112  1.444 0.306  0.410 0.895  3.620 0.042  0.876 0.579  0.539 0.848  -5.369 0.178  0.572 0.843  -7.586 0.083 
B  3.049 0.215  -2.601 0.002  -1.823 0.045  4.540 0.176  -2.500 0.007  -1.798 0.060  3.396 0.263  1.197 0.756  3.339 0.285  -0.905 0.830 
H  3.044 0.028  6.294 0.000  4.244 0.000  2.848 0.124  5.978 0.001  4.473 0.000  3.538 0.043  2.355 0.270  3.521 0.049  2.241 0.296 
I  -2.596 0.072  -0.439 0.368  -0.972 0.070  -1.985 0.317  -0.011 0.985  -1.004 0.074  -2.151 0.238  0.380 0.872  -2.203 0.239  1.271 0.605 
                                         
constant  0.621 0.777  1.462 0.492  0.017 0.990  5.331 0.177  4.954 0.134  4.166 0.049  1.287 0.581  9.643 0.045  1.736 0.475  10.573 0.033 
                                         
Initial GDP                         -.504 0.543  2.217 0.277 
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Table 4.2. 
 
Commitments to the four development axes regressed on regional growth. Panel data analysis. 
 
  Current year  Lag1  Lag2  Lag3  ...  Lag6  Lag7 
(Objective 1 regions only)                 
                           
Number of groups  47    47    47    47      47   47  
Avg obs per group  9.3    9.3    8.4    7.6      4.8   3.9  
Max obs per group  10    10    9    8      5   4  
                           
R
2 within  0.0138    0.0040    0.0061    0.0161      0.0121   0.0608 
R
2 between  0.3565    0.3769    0.3321    0.3271      0.2099   0.2622 
R
2 overall  0.0476    0.0391    0.0394    0.0492      0.0489   0.0899 
                           
  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig.    coeff.  sig.  coeff.  sig. 
                           
A  2.2106  0.052  0.2317  0.836 1.1315  0.384  -0.9407  0.541    -2.1268 0.571  -3.1027 0.362 
B  -0.0650  0.927  -0.6445  0.378 0.2787  0.739  -1.4127  0.158    -1.6349 0.715  2.3302 0.621 
H  1.5021  0.114  1.6008  0.101 1.6799  0.111  1.7600  0.131    3.5905 0.120  4.0255 0.063 
I  -0.6767  0.171  -0.1416  0.795 -0.6312  0.292  0.4211  0.540    -0.9542 0.696  -0.6344 0.790 
                           
Emp  -9.2010  0.001  -8.7206  0.002 -9.6148  0.001  -9.1714  0.004    -9.7093 0.051  -9.0964 0.032 
Yunem  -1.6619  0.006  -1.5305  0.013 -1.5785  0.019  -1.3695  0.067    -1.5641 0.194  -1.3907 0.181 
Fememp  3.7447  0.051  3.2833  0.087 4.6274  0.027  3.6687  0.116    1.9871 0.576  5.3940 0.088 
Agremp  -0.2371  0.359  -0.1460  0.574 -0.1743  0.536  -0.0189  0.950    -0.1237 0.785  -0.0338 0.933 
                           
Constant  7.1961  0.003  6.9246  0.005 6.5713  0.014  6.5627  0.027    9.4421 0.049  5.0894 0.218 
                       
Breutsch-Pagan                       
chi
2  3.1500    3.6600    3.6100    4.8000      1.5200   3.2000 
Prob > chi
2  0.0761    0.0557    0.0575    0.0284      0.2174   0.0736 
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